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The mechanisms underlying cascading failures are often modeled via the paradigm of self-
organized criticality. Here we introduce a simple model where nodes self-organize to be either
weak or strong to failure which captures the trade-off between degradation and reinforcement of
nodes inherent in many network systems. If strong nodes cannot fail, this leads to power law distri-
butions of failure sizes with so-called “Black Swan” rare events. In contrast, if strong nodes fail once
a sufficient fraction of their neighbors fail, this leads to “Dragon Kings”, which are massive failures
caused by mechanisms distinct from smaller failures. In our model, we find that once an initial
failure size is above a critical value, the Dragon King mechanism kicks in, leading to piggybacking
system-wide failures. We demonstrate that the size of the initial failed weak cluster predicts the
likelihood of a Dragon King event with high accuracy and we develop a simple control strategy
which also reveals that a random upgrade can inadvertently make the system more vulnerable. The
Dragon Kings observed are self-organized, existing throughout the parameter regime.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Da 02.30.Yy 05.65.+b
Natural and engineered systems that usually operate
in a manageable regime may nonetheless be prone to
rare, catastrophic events [1–12]. Two categories for such
events have been proposed: Black Swans, which are tail
events in a power-law distribution, and Dragon Kings
(DKs), which are outliers involving mechanisms absent
in smaller events that occur far more frequently than
a power-law would predict. The power-law distribution
necessary for Black Swans to exist is often explained by
self-organized criticality (SOC): a tug-of-war that poises
the system close to a critical point without any need for
tuning of external parameters [5–8]. Although the predic-
tion of Black Swans can sometimes beat random chance
[13], the task appears to be inherently difficult [14, 15].
Despite this drawback, there are simple methods to push
SOC systems away from criticality, thus reducing the size
of Black Swans [8, 16, 17].
It has been proposed that DKs occur in complex sys-
tems that have low heterogeneity and strong coupling
(as defined in [18]) and that, in contrast, Black Swans
occur in systems with weaker coupling and higher hetero-
geneity. Whereas Black Swans often have no associated
length- and time-scales, DK events do: there are typical
places and times when DKs will and will not occur. This
has been successfully applied to, for example, prediction
of material failure and crashes of stock markets [1], and
has been seen in engineered systems, such as error cas-
cades in a collection of robots [19]. Unlike Black Swans,
however, it has been an open problem to control DKs
in many situations and to elucidate the mechanisms un-
derlying these often self-amplifying cascades [2]. Recent
advances on controlling DKs have been based on low-
dimensional models, such as coupled oscillators [20], but
control of DKs in models of high-dimensional complex
systems has been lacking.
In this Letter, we introduce a simple model where
nodes in a network self-organize to be “weak” or “strong”
to failure, capturing the tradeoffs between degradation
and reinforcement of elements in a system. The initial
failure of a random weak node can lead to a cascade of
subsequent node failures. A weak node fails as soon as
one of its neighbors fails, and a failed weak node has
small probability, , to be reinforced and upgraded to
a strong node upon repair. Strong nodes independently
degrade (i.e., become weak) at a slow rate. If strong
nodes cannot fail, we call the model the “inoculation”
(IN) model [21]. This is akin to site percolation because
a failure is contained to an individual cluster of adjacent
weak nodes. If strong nodes fail as soon as two of their
neighbors fail, we call the model the “complex contagion”
(CC) model [22]. This model can lead to self-amplifying
failures that cascade across clusters of weak nodes. The
CC model is to our knowledge the simplest model that
produces self-amplifying cascading failures, and the IN
model provides a null model for baseline behavior.
We are interested in the long-term behavior: each cas-
cade causes small changes in the number of weak and
strong nodes, and both models self-organize to specific
(but distinct) states. While the IN model is similar in
spirit to some previous self-organized critical models of
engineered systems [7, 8], the CC model is expected to
spontaneously generate DKs (failures of nearly the en-
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2tire system) over all values of  < 1, a prediction that
we have confirmed for  over several orders of magni-
tude.The main reason for this difference is that the CC
model enables cluster hopping cascades that occur once
the first cluster of weak nodes to fail is sufficiently large,
as shown herein. We take advantage of this finding to
predict whether a small initial failure will cascade into a
DK event by showing that the probability that a strong
node, which bridges weak-node clusters, will have two
neighbors in the initial failing cluster can be mapped onto
a generalization of the birthday problem [23]. Once this
probability is significant, then failures are likely to spread
from the first weak-node cluster to subsequent weak-node
clusters. More strong nodes are then likely to fail by pig-
gybacking off of the previous failures. We can make a
qualitative analogy to the gas-water phase transition in
condensed matter, where droplets can nucleate. In both
our model and in droplet nucleation, there is a critical
size, above which the droplet or failed cluster grows al-
most without bound [24], although in the CC model, clus-
ters of any size can form (there is no analogous surface
tension).
We also develop a simple targeted-reinforcement con-
trol strategy, in which we turn a few fairly well-chosen
weak-nodes into strong nodes, and decrease the likelihood
of DKs and other large failures by orders of magnitude.
Self-organizing models. The dynamics of our models
depend on two competing mechanisms: degradation and
reinforcement. Degradation, which represents the aging
of infrastructure or an increase of load placed on them,
is modeled by slowly converting strong nodes into weak
ones. Conversely, reinforcement converts weak nodes
that fail during a cascading event into strong nodes at
rate , representing the hardening of nodes in an at-
tempt to prevent future failures. This repair strategy
mimics modern-day power grid guidelines [25], where re-
sources are allocated to places were failures happen more
often. The trade-off between degradation and reinforce-
ment drives the system to an SOC state.
For simplicity, we consider dynamics on 3-regular ran-
dom networks with N nodes, where N is an even positive
integer. Repeated edges and self-loops are allowed, but
are rare when N is large. The system size N and the
probability  are the model’s only parameters. We are
particularly interested in large N and small , but due
to motivation from real-world systems, we are also inter-
ested in finite-size effects as well as the consequences of
a non-zero  (i.e., having a budget for reinforcement).
Both the CC and IN models follow the same general
algorithm. Weak nodes fail if at least one of their neigh-
bors fail which can cause subsequent failures. The dis-
tinction is that under the CC model, strong nodes fail
if at least two of their neighbors fail, whereas in the IN
model, strong nodes cannot fail. In detail, we initialize all
N nodes as weak and each discrete time step 0 ≤ t ≤ tstop
proceeds according to the following algorithm.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Self-organizing behavior and failure
size. Top row: Fraction of weak nodes p(t) vs. t for the (a)
IN and (b) CC models over individual network realizations for
N = 106. Bottom row: Failure size distribution for the (c)
IN and (d) CC models, with the DK outliers labeled. Sym-
bols denote results of simulations on random 3-regular graphs
averaged over ten network realizations and 15×N time steps.
Degradation: Select a node uniformly at random. If
that node is strong, make it weak and proceed to
the beginning of the Degradation step with t ←
t+ 1. If the selected node is already weak, then it
fails, and continue with the remaining three steps.
Cascade: Apply the IN or CC failure-spreading mech-
anism until no more failures occur. Failed nodes
remain failed for the duration of the cascade.
Repair: All failed nodes are un-failed (strong failed
nodes become strong un-failed nodes, and weak
failed nodes become weak un-failed nodes).
Reinforcement: Each weak node that failed at this
time step has probability  to become strong. Pro-
ceed back to the Degradation step with t← t+ 1.
The IN model is similar to the SIRS model in epidemi-
ology [26], except that failed (i.e., infected) nodes can
directly become un-failed (i.e., susceptible) again. Many
other choices for initial conditions are possible, but our
investigations show that the steady state behavior is in-
dependent of these choices (see SI). Because we currently
initialize all nodes as weak, the sizes of the first few cas-
cades are on the order of the system size, and numerous
node upgrades take place before the system equilibrates.
An important indicator that we have reached the relax-
ation time is the proportion of nodes that are weak at
time t, p(t), which is shown in the top row of Fig. 1.
We wait until well after p(t) stabilizes (5×N timesteps)
and then calculate failure sizes for a subsequent 15N
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FIG. 2. (Color online) DKs form by cascading failures of
weak-node clusters. (a) Weak-node clusters (circled) are sur-
rounded by strong nodes. If one such strong node (S1) has
two links connecting to the same weak-node cluster, the fail-
ure of this cluster (with size Cw,1) will make the strong node
fail, and the cascade may spread to other weak-node clusters
(e.g., one of size Cw,2), and thus other strong nodes (e.g., S2),
eventually creating a DK event. (b) A heat map of the prob-
ability a DK occurs in the CC model conditioned on Cw,1,
the size of the weak-node cluster that first fails, versus N and
Cw,1 for  = 10
−3. Black dashed line is the simulation result
for Ccrit,DK, while solid lines denote our analytic calculations
of two-step failure cascades Ccrit,2 (green line) and one-step
failure cascades Ccrit,1 (white line).
timesteps. Although we cannot prove that the model
has reached equilibrium, waiting longer, and varying the
initial conditions (see SI) produces quantitatively similar
results. For the IN model, we find that p(t) is almost
independent of  as  → 0, but in the CC model, the
steady-state value of p(t) depends on .
Failure size distribution. The results for the failure
size distribution, P (s), are illustrated in the bottom row
of Fig. 1, which demonstrates each model’s propensity
to create large events. The probability of large failures
generally increases with decreasing  for both the IN and
CC models because, if less nodes are reinforced, cascades
can more easily spread and affect larger portions of a
network. For small enough , we find that the cascade
size distributions for the IN and CC models exhibit a
power-law with exponential decay, however the CC model
also has a DK tail, where over 99.9% of nodes fail in each
DK event (cf. Fig. 1(d)). Furthermore, they appear to
have two different power-law exponents: α = −1.11 for
the IN model and α = −1.24 for the CC model when
 = 3.2 × 10−4 and N = 106 (in comparison, traditional
SOC models yield α = −1.5 [27, 28]).
Dragon King Mechanism. Why do DKs occur in the
CC model? To establish a theoretical understanding of
DKs, we first note that a failure in any part of a weak-
node cluster makes that entire cluster fail. A necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for a DK to occur is that
strong nodes bridging the first failed weak-node cluster
must also fail (cf. Fig. 2(a)), which we call it a one-step
failure cascade. In the simplest case, only one strong
node bridges two weak-node clusters. We first analyze
the probability that the failure of a weak-node cluster,
with size Cw,1, will lead to the failure of at least one
bridging strong node, denoted by S1, and find that S1
nodes can accurately model the probability of multiple
weak-node clusters failing (see SI).
The one-step failure cascade is, however, a poor ap-
proximation of a DK event (cf. Fig. 2(b)), where cas-
cades lead to yet more cascades (i.e., failed weak-node
clusters lead to subsequent cluster failures until almost
all nodes fail). To better understand DKs, we need to
know whether the one-step failure cascade will lead to
further failures, e.g., a two-step cascade, which requires
a bridging node of type “S2” in Fig. 2(a). To obtain this
probability, we first prove that the number of weak-node
clusters that fail just after the first weak-node cluster fails
is Poisson distributed. Furthermore, if we assume that
the clusters are independent and identically distributed
random variables from a scale-free distribution (which
has been numerically verified from our simulation), then
we can find the distribution of failed weak nodes after a
one-step failure cascade, which we use to calculate the
probability of two-step failure cascades, given the initial
cluster size Cw,1. We numerically find that the critical
value of Cw,1 such that P (two-step cascade|Cw,1) = 1/2,
which we denote by Ccrit,2, occurs when
Ccrit,2 ∼ N0.55±0.01. (1)
Although a necessary condition, a two-step failure
cascade does not always create a DK, therefore
P (two-step cascade|Cw,1) > P (DK|Cw,1), which implies
that Ccrit,2 < Ccrit,DK, where Ccrit,DK is the critical
size of Cw,1 such that P (DK|Cw,1) = 1/2. We find
that these bounds agree with what we see numerically
(cf. Fig. 2(b)), and Ccrit,2 is in much closer agreement
than Ccrit,1 is to Ccrit,DK. (Note Ccrit,1 is defined as the
critical size of Cw,1 such that P (one-step cascade|Cw,1) =
1/2). We next consider how these critical values scale
with system size. Equation (1) implies that O(N0.55) ≤
Ccrit,DK ≤ N . These bounds are in agreement with
the numerical scaling, in which Ccrit,DK ∼ Nγ , where
γ = 0.59±0.03 (see SI). Importantly, Ccrit,DK scales sub-
linearly, therefore only a small proportion of the network
needs to initially fail before a DK is likely to occur.
Finally, we can discuss how P (DK) varies with N and
. First, we make simplifying assumptions that the initial
failure of any weak-node cluster of size Cw,1 greater than
Ccrit,DK creates a DK, and approximate P (Cw,1) as a
power-law with an exponential cut-off, λ, that is propor-
tional to  (see SI for Fig. S15). We find that increasing
 by a small amount creates an unexpectedly large per-
centage reduction of P (DK) as well as a large percentage
reduction in failures that are not DKs (cf. Fig. 1). If
4N
FIG. 3. (Color online) Predicting DKs. The area under the
receiver operating characteristic (AUC) for logistic models of
P (DK|p) (closed symbols and solid lines) and P (DK|Cw,1)
(open symbols and dashed lines) for varying N [29].
 is proportional to the cost of upgrades, then our re-
sults suggest that upgrading failed components in a sys-
tem slightly more frequently can dramatically reduce the
probability of large-scale failures. Surprisingly, DKs ex-
ist for any value of  < 1. This is because the critical
weak-node cluster size increases sub-linearly with N , and
the weak-node cluster size can be any value less than N ,
therefore there is some probability that a weak-node clus-
ter that fails will be above the critical weak-node cluster
size, which will likely trigger a DK.
When  → 0 and N is large, the theory suggests that
P (DK) ∼ N−0.15±0.02 (see SI), therefore DKs slowly dis-
appear in the thermodynamic limit, but the scaling ex-
ponent is so small, that DK events are visible for almost
any value of N and .
Predicting Dragon Kings. DKs are, in contrast to
Black Swans [13, 14], fairly predictable [1], although it
may not be obvious what independent variables best indi-
cate these events. For example, we find little correlation
in the time between DKs (the autocorrelation is < 0.01
for N = 106, see SI), therefore, knowing the time-series
of DKs will not tell is when another will necessarily oc-
cur. To answer this question, we analyze two different
predictors. The first predictor is the fraction of weak
nodes present in the network. The rational is that more
weak nodes create larger initial failures, and therefore
create more DKs. The second predictor is the size of the
first weak-node cluster, Cw,1. We earlier established that
the probability of DKs correlates with Cw,1, although we
have yet to see whether this is adequate for predicting
DKs. Both of these predictors are complimentary, be-
cause the former would tell us when a DK might occur,
while the latter would tell us where a DK might originate.
We model P (DK|p) versus p, and P (DK|Cw,1) versus
Cw,1, respectively, using logistic regression. Unless  is
relatively large, p is a poor predictor as based on the
area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUC,
cf. Fig. 3) [29]. Thus, predicting when a DK would occur
is inherently challenging. In contrast, by knowing Cw,1
alone, we can predict DKs with astounding accuracy, al-
most independent of N and . The high accuracy is due
to the characteristic size of the initial failure that triggers
a DK, Ccrit,DK (see SI for figure). This is reminiscent of
previous results on controlling DKs in a system of oscilla-
tors where a trajectory straying past a particular thresh-
old is very likely to create a DK [20, 30]. Finding the
weak-node cluster size, Cw,1 (which is much smaller than
the system size), for each weak node requires only search-
ing locally in the network, therefore, given an initial fail-
ure, we can accurately predict whether a DK would occur
with relatively little effort. Similarly, to “tame” DKs, we
can use a simple control mechanism that requires know-
ing the size of just a few weak-node clusters, as seen in
the next section.
Controlling Dragon Kings. Because large weak-node
cluster failures precede DKs, we can reasonably ask
whether breaking up these clusters before they fail can
reduce the prevalence of DKs. Assuming that the rate of
node upgrades is proportional to the amount of “money”
or effort allocated for repairing nodes, we create con-
trol strategies where this rate is kept the same on av-
erage as the non-controlled case, meaning p(t) remains
approximately constant. Instead of randomly reinforcing
failed weak nodes, we upgrade weak nodes in large clus-
ters by picking r weak nodes and finding the size of the
weak-node clusters to which they belong. The largest of
these weak-node clusters is selected and with probabil-
ity 1− p(t), a random node in that cluster is reinforced.
We find that, when r = 1, more DKs occur than with-
out control therefore random attempts to reduce the size
of failures could actually make the failures substantially
worse. However, larger r represents a better sampling
of the cluster sizes, and a greater chance for large clus-
ters to be broken apart, which reduces the probability
of DKs by orders of magnitude (cf. Fig. 4(a)), as well as
large failures that are not DKs (cf. Fig. 4(b)). Further-
more, the number of nodes we have to search through
is only r × 〈Cw,1〉  N on average, which makes this
technique applicable in systems where global knowledge
of the network is lacking.
Discussion. We have shown that DKs can self-
organize in the CC model via runaway failure cascades.
Moreover, this mechanism allows for DKs to be easily
predicted and controlled. We believe that this model can
describe a number of mechanisms, discussed below.
The CC model allows for individuals with simple con-
tagion dynamics (weak nodes) [31], and complex conta-
gion dynamics (strong nodes) [32], to co-exist on a net-
work. It assumes that agents become “complex” at a rate
 after they have adopted an idea (i.e. failed), which can
be interpreted as agents exhibiting greater stubbornness
to new ideas. The CC model suggests that agents can
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Controlling DKs. (a) The probability
a DK occurs over time versus  in both the non-controlled
scenario (NC, pentagons), and in the controlled scenario with
r weak-nodes chosen: r = 1 (circles), r = 3 (diamonds),
r = 5 (squares) and r = 7 (triangles). Simulations are realized
for N = 106, and standard errors are smaller than marker
sizes. See main text for details of the control method. (b)
Failure size distributions for different control strategies and
non-controlled with  = 3.2× 10−4.
self-organize to a state in which global adoption (DKs)
occurs surprisingly often. This could explain, for exam-
ple, the mechanism of large financial drawdowns in stock
markets, which are found to be DKs [1], where social
interactions, seen in stock market participation [33] and
foreign exchange trading [34], can convince brokers to
buy or sell as a group. Some brokers will buy (sell) stock
when any neighbor does, while other agents buy (sell)
stock only after a sufficient fraction of their neighbors
do. Our model may also represent mechanisms for cas-
cading failures of engineered systems, where reinforce-
ment of failed units (represented as nodes in our model)
is a common practice [25]. Nodes, representing a part
of a complex system, can degrade and be reinforced at
slow rates to represent upgrade costs that are high and
often limited to the point of making the system barely
stable [7, 8]. Surprisingly, however, we find that reinforc-
ing a system slightly more often, or selectively reinforcing
nodes (the control strategy with r > 3), creates a signif-
icant percentage drop in the frequency of DKs. In con-
trast, naively reinforcing nodes at random (the control
strategy with r = 1) dramatically increases the frequency
of DKs.
The CC model provides a novel self-amplifying mech-
anism for cascading failures, and can help explain why
DKs exist in the failure size distribution of real systems.
Future work, however, is necessary to fully understand
DKs. The research presented here provides a concrete
methodology to begin studying how DKs are driven by
the interplay of heterogeneity (for example the variance
of node degree and the diversity of thresholds for strong
nodes) and coupling (e.g., average node degree) in a prin-
cipled manner, which is still in its infancy [1]. We have
also not explored the effect that the mean degree, the
degree distribution, or the failure threshold has on CC
dynamics. Generalizing the CC model to these networks
also creates additional degrees of freedom, for example
the failure dynamics could depend on the minimum num-
ber of neighboring agents [22], or minimum fraction of
neighboring agents [35], that need to fail for the failure
to spread to a strong node. This distinction becomes
important for heavy-tailed degree distributions.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR
“SELF-ORGANIZATION OF DRAGON KINGS”
This supplemental material provides several additional
results and derivations to support the main text. In
the first section, we discuss how alternative initial condi-
tions do not appear to affect the dynamics in equilibrium.
Then in the second section, we elucidate the Dragon King
(DK) mechanism for the Complex Contagion (CC) model
by deriving Eq. (1) in the main text. Furthermore, we
derive scaling laws to better understand whether DKs
exist in the thermodynamic limit, and compare the the-
oretical probability of multi-step failures to simulations,
conditioned on the initial failure size. In the third sec-
tion, we compare the theoretical probability of DKs con-
ditioned on  and N to simulations. In the fourth section,
we present the failure size distributions for finite system
size. In the fifth section, we show the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves associated with Fig. 3 in the
main text. Finally, in the last section, we show that the
control strategy has little effect on the fraction of weak
nodes in our network, therefore, we are able to suppress
DK failures while repairing the same number of nodes,
on average.
I: Alternative Initial Conditions
We ask whether the steady state behavior of our Inoc-
ulation (IN) and CC models is independent of our initial
conditions. To check this, we calculate the equilibrium
fraction of weak nodes in the network, 〈p〉, and the prob-
ability of a DK, across various initial conditions as we
vary . In Fig. S5, we demonstrate that the fraction of
weak nodes over time, p(t), stabilizes to a value, 〈p〉, af-
ter a time, t, greater than trelax = 5×N timesteps across
several different initial conditions in both models. To
further demonstrate this, in Fig. S6 we plot the average
fraction of weak nodes, 〈p〉, after trelax = 5×N for differ-
ent reinforcement probabilities  and find no statistically
significant difference. Although we demonstrate that the
number of weak nodes does not appear to be affected by
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FIG. S5. (Color online) Fraction of weak nodes, p(t), over
time for various initial conditions. We vary the initial frac-
tion of weak nodes, pinitial, from 0.25 to 1.0 for (a) the IN
model and (b) the CC model. The equilibrium value, 〈p〉, is
not significantly different for various initial conditions after a
time, t, greater than trelax = 5×N timesteps. In this figure,
we take one network realization with N = 106,  = 3.2×10−4.
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FIG. S6. (Color online) Average fraction of weak nodes after
trelax = 5 × N for different initial conditions (a) for the IN
model and (b) for the CC model. The results are averaged for
N = 106 over 15×N timesteps and 5 network realizations.
the initial conditions, this does not guarantee that the
distribution of cascade failures is unaffected. As a simple
check for the CC model, Fig. S7 shows that pinitial has
little effect on the probability of DK, P (DK). In fact,
we find no statistically significant difference in P (DK)
across initial conditions. Overall, it does not appear as
though the dynamics are affected by initial conditions for
t > trelax.
II: Dragon King Mechanism
A First Step
In this section, we present the probability of a cascade
spreading from the initial weak-node cluster to any other
weak-node cluster, which we call a one-step failure cas-
cade. We assume there are N nodes, and (1 − 〈p〉)N
strong nodes each of which may have between zero and
three weak-node neighbors. In addition, a failure begins
at a weak node within a weak-node connected cluster of
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FIG. S7. (Color online) Probability of DK vs.  for differ-
ent pinitial in the CC model for network size with N = 10
6.
Standard errors are smaller than marker sizes.
size Cw,1. Based on simulations, the weak-node cluster
is approximately a tree, therefore the number of links,
Lw,1, from the first weak-node cluster to strong nodes
should be Cw,1 + 2. Under an annealed network config-
uration model assumption, we sequentially connect links
from the weak-node cluster to strong nodes. After m
links are added, the probability that a subsequent link
connects to a strong node with three weak-node neigh-
bors, is
ρm,j =
3q(1− 〈p〉)N − j
(1− 〈p〉)N 〈k〉 −m
≈ ρ = 3q〈k〉 ,
(S2)
where q is the average fraction of strong nodes with three
weak-node neighbors, j is the number of links already
connected to strong nodes with three weak-node neigh-
bors and 〈k〉 is the average number of weak nodes a strong
node connects to. We assume m, j  (1−〈p〉)N 〈k〉, and
therefore drop second-order terms.
The probability for the m + 1th link from the weak-
node cluster to connect to any strong node that has three
weak-node neighbors with one neighbor already in the
same weak-node cluster is
7P (new S1|m) =
m∑
j=0
[(
m
j
)
ρj(1− ρ)m−j 2j
(1− 〈p〉)N 〈k〉 −m
]
=
6mq
〈k〉
1
(1− 〈p〉)N 〈k〉 −m,
(S3)
where we average over j. The probability that two or
more links from the weak-node cluster connect to at least
one strong node with three weak-node neighbors (where
we again average over all j) is
P (S1|Cw,1) = 1−
Lw,1−1∏
m=1
(1− P (new S1|m))
≈ 1−
Lw,1−1∏
m=1
(
1− m
Neff
)
,
(S4)
where
Neff = N
(1− 〈p〉) 〈k〉2
6q
. (S5)
Interestingly, the formula (S4) is equivalent to a general-
ized birthday problem, where Neff is the effective number
of “days in a year” and Lw,1 = Cw,1 + 2 is the number of
“people”. Following previous literature [36], the critical
value of Cw,1 is
Ccrit,1 =
√
2log(2)Neff, (S6)
which is the white line in Fig. 2 of the main text.
Comparison between one-step failure cascade theory and
simulations
Next, we compare the one-step failure cascade the-
ory (Eq. (S4)) to one-step failure cascade simulations
(Fig. S8). We find that theory and simulation results
match well.
Going One Step Further...
It is important to not only understand how the first
step in a failure cascade occurs, but also how the addi-
tional steps of a failure cascade which might ultimately
results in a DK event. As a next step, we ask what is
the probability for a two-step failure cascade, in which
a weak-node cluster fails after a one-step failure cas-
cade. The simplest way this can occur is when a strong
node with three weak-node neighbors fails (see S′1 in
Fig. S9(b)), because it can bridge the failed cluster and
a new weak-node cluster. In order to find this probabil-
ity, we will need to find the probability that the S′1 node
will connect to two failed nodes. First, to determine how
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FIG. S8. (Color online) The probability of failure spreading
out from the initial failed weak-node cluster. Open markers
represent the probability that a failure spreads from the first
weak-node cluster to any other weak-node clusters, based on
model simulations. Solid lines represent theoretical results
of P (S1|Cw,1), which is the simplest way a failure can spread
between weak-node clusters. Standard errors are smaller than
marker sizes, except for N = 103 and  = 1.0× 10−3.
many nodes failed, we first recall that the probability
for the first strong nodes to fail in the cascade, S1 in
Fig. S9(a), is a generalized birthday problem (see pre-
vious subsections), therefore the probability for k nodes
like S1 to fail is Poisson distributed, for large Neff and
Lw,1:
PS1(k) = e
−λw,1 λ
k
w,1
k!
, (S7)
where
λw,1 =
Lw,1(Lw,1 − 1)
2Neff
. (S8)
Intuitively, this is because each event (the failure of S1-
like nodes) is statistically independent, and occurs with a
low probability (P (Cw,1 > Ccrit,DK) is small), and there
are lots of opportunities for the event to occur (Neff is
large). For each weak-node cluster, i, to fail from an S1-
like strong node, let the size of the cluster be C
(i)
w,2, and
let Cw,2 =
∑k
i=1 C
(i)
w,2, then the probability Cw,2 > 0 is
P (S1|Cw,1) = 1− e−λw,1 . (S9)
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FIG. S9. (Color online) How cascades occur. (a) Failures
spread from a single weak-node to an entire connected cluster
of weak-nodes. Strong nodes are usually resistant to failure,
unless they connect to the same failed cluster (S1). (b) Once
enough weak-node clusters fail, there is a chance that failures
can spread to yet more clusters (of size Cw,3) via strong nodes
that bridge failed weak clusters (S′1).
This can also be derived from Eq. (S4), by taking
Lw,1−1∏
m=1
(
1− m
Neff
)
= e
log
(∏Lw,1−1
m=1
(
1− mNeff
))
= e
∑Lw,1−1
m=1 log
(
1− mNeff
)
≈ e−Lw,1(Lw,1−1)/(2Neff).
(S10)
Using this approximation, we can directly solve for when
P (S1|Cw,1) = 1/2 (Eq. (S6)).
Now that we know the distribution of weak-node clus-
ters that first fail (Eq. (S7)), we need to know how many
nodes are in each weak-node secondary cluster fail. For
each cluster of size C
(i)
w,2, there are L
(i)
w,2 = C
(i)
w,2 + 2 edges
connected to strong nodes. Furthermore, we find em-
pirically that the size distribution of weak-node clusters
is
P (Cw) ∼ C−ηw , (S11)
where η = 2.26 ± 0.03 (measured for  = 3.2 × 10−4
and N = 106, see Fig. S10). Note, however, that the
size distribution of C
(i)
w,2 is not Eq. (S11), because the
number of opportunities to connect to a node of size C
(i)
w,2
is proportional to the number of links emanating from
the cluster, which increases as L
(i)
w,2. Namely, S1 is a
strong node with three weak-node neighbors, and there
are on average qL
(i)
w,2 strong nodes with three weak-node
neighbors connected to a cluster of size C
(i)
w,2. Therefore,
the probability to connect to any cluster of size C
(i)
w,2,
Pw,2(C
(i)
w,2), is
Pw,2(C
(i)
w,2) =
P (Cw = C
(i)
w,2)qL
(i)
w,2
〈qL(i)w,2〉
=
P (C
(i)
w,2)L
(i)
w,2
〈L(i)w,2〉
.
(S12)
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FIG. S10. (Color online) Weak cluster size distribution,
P (Cw), for N = 10
6 and 10 network realizations at t = 9×N .
The parameter η is fitting exponent of the maximum likeli-
hood power-law with exponential tail.
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FIG. S11. (Color online) The probability of a two-step failure
cascade.
This is intuitively similar to “excess degree” seen in
random network literature (Eq. (22) in [37]).
S′1-like nodes can only appear through one of two con-
ditions: (1) an S′1 node is created from two links in the
non-initial clusters (left probability in Fig. S11), or (2)
an S′1 node spans the initial weak-node cluster, and a
newer cluster (right probability in Fig. S11). Therefore
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1) is 1 minus the probability that both
conditions do not occur.
Condition (1) is the simpler of the two to calculate,
because the derivation for the equation is very similar to
that of equation (S9). For each secondary cluster, the
number of links is L
′(i)
w,2 = C
(i)
w,2 +2−1, where we subtract
one because one link is used to connect to the initial
cluster, therefore L′w,2 =
∑k
i=1 L
′(i)
w,2 =
∑k
i=1 C
(i)
w,2 + k,
and
P (Cw,3 = 0|condition (1)) = e−λw,2 , (S13)
where
λw,2 =
L′w,2(L
′
w,2 − 1)
2Neff
. (S14)
To solve for condition (2), note that there are L′w,1 =
Cw,1 + 2 − 2k = Cw,1 − 2(k − 1) links available from
the initial cluster, because 2k links were used to connect
to S1-like nodes. There are qL
′
w,1 links from the initial
weak-node cluster to strong nodes with three weak-node
neighbors, therefore, there are 2qL′w,1 opportunities for
strong nodes with three weak-node neighbors to connect
to any secondary failed weak-node clusters. The proba-
bility for one link from the initial cluster to connect to
9any of the secondary failed weak-node clusters is
P (1 link→ Cw,2) =
qL′w,2
qpN
, (S15)
where the denominator is the total number of links from
weak-node clusters to strong nodes with three weak-node
neighbors. This implies that the probability at least one
strong node has a link in the initial and secondary clus-
ters is
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1 ↔ Cw,2) = 1−
(
1− qL
′
w,2
qpN
)2qL′w,1
.
(S16)
Similar logic from the perspective of the secondary
weak-node clusters suggests that
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,2 ↔ Cw,1) = 1−
(
1− L
′
w,1
pN
)2qL′w,2
.
(S17)
We therefore have a paradox. We expect that the prob-
ability for a strong node to span initial and secondary
clusters should be independent of the order we choose to
connect them (the probability of the secondary clusters
connecting to the initial cluster should be the same as the
initial to the secondary clusters). However, if we make an
ansatz that 1  L′w,1  N and 1  L′w,2  N , we can
take the Taylor series of either equation and approximate
the sum as
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1 ↔ Cw,2) ≈ P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,2 ↔ Cw,1)
≈ 1− e−λw,1↔2 ,
(S18)
or
P (Cw,3 = 0|condition (2)) ≈ e−λw,1↔2 , (S19)
where
λw,1↔2 =
2qL′w,1L
′
w,2
pN
. (S20)
This equation is also order-independent, as we ex-
pect. We can therefore write P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1) as
the probability that neither condition (1) nor condi-
tion (2) occurs (i.e., Fig. S11). Recall that this is
the probability that at least one S′1-like node occurs
over all values of C
(1)
w,2, C
(2)
w,2, ..., C
(k)
w,2. The prob-
ability of k different S1-like nodes is PS1(k), while
Pw,2(C
(1)
w,2, C
(2)
w,2, ..., C
(k)
w,2) = Pw,2(C
(1)
w,2) × Pw,2(C(1)w,2) ×
... × Pw,2(C(k)w,2), where Pw,2(C(i)w,2) is Eq. (S12). There-
fore, if we approximate C
(i)
w,2 as a continuous variable,
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1) can be written as
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1) =
∞∑
k=1
PS1(k)
∫ ∞
C
(1)
w,2=1
∫ ∞
C
(2)
w,2=1
...
∫ ∞
C
(k)
w,2=1
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1, C(1)w,2, ..., C(k)w,2)Pw,2(C(1)w,2)× Pw,2(C(1)w,2)× ...× Pw,2(C(k)w,2),
(S21)
where
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1, C(1)w,2, ..., C(k)w,2) = 1− e−λw,2−λw,1↔2 . (S22)
In Eq. (S21), we notice that the lower bound of each integral is 1 simply because C
(i)
w,2 ≥ 1, i.e., there must be at least
one node. Using the above findings, Eq. (S21) can be written more compactly as
P (Cw,3 > 0|Cw,1) =
∞∑
k=1
PS1(k)
(
1−
∫ ∞
C
(1)
w,2,C
(2)
w,2,...C
(k)
w,2=1
e−λw,2−λw,1↔2
k∏
i=1
Pw,2(C
(i)
w,2)dC
(i)
w,2
)
. (S23)
As a sanity check, if λw,2 = λw,1↔2 → ∞, which is the
unrealistic condition that Cw,3 > 0 whenever Cw,2 > 0,
the equation reduces to Eq. (S9). In this equation, we
recall that C
(i)
w,2 are all independent, and λw,2 and λw,1↔2
are defined to be a function of
∑k
i=1 C
(i)
w,2. Sadly, how-
ever, this integral is not analytically tractable, therefore
we numerically determine the integral using Mathemat-
ica. For large k, we suffer from the curse of dimension-
ality, therefore we use a cutoff: we ignore any k where
PS1(k) < δ, where δ = 10
−4.
Comparison of two-step failure cascade theory and
simulations
Finally we can compare the two-step failure cascade
theory to the one-step failure cascade theory and to sim-
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FIG. S12. (Color online) Probability of one-step and two-
step failure cascades and DKs versus Cw,1. Solid lines are
the theoretical probabilities of (a) one-step and (b) two-step
failure cascades, and plot markers are the simulation-based
probabilities of DKs versus Cw,1 for  = 1.00× 10−3.
ulations of DKs. The first thing we notice is that, as
expected, the agreement with simulations of DKs is not
perfect, especially for large N (cf. Fig. S12(b)), because
the theory is still a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for DKs, although it is a significant improvement
over the one-step failure cascade (cf. Fig. S12(a)). We
also notice that the critical values of Cw,1 for the prob-
ability of the one-step cascade to be 1/2, Ccrit,1, the
critical values of Cw,1 for the two-step cascade proba-
bility to be 1/2, Ccrit,2, and the critical values of Cw,1
for the probability of a DK to be 1/2, Ccrit,DK, all
scale differently with system size. As Eq. (S6) shows, in
the one-step failure cascade theory, Ccrit,1 ∼ N b where
b = 0.5, while we find that, for the two-step failure cas-
cade theory, b = 0.55± 0.01, and for simulations of DKs,
b = 0.59± 0.03 (cf. Fig. S13). To see more explicitly how
two-step failure cascade theory and one-step failure cas-
cade theory differ in their scaling, we can look at Fig. S14,
where it is clear that the two-step failure cascade theory
reaches probability 1/2 at larger and larger values of Cw,1
as N increases, compared to the one-step failure cascade
theory.
III: How the Probability of Dragon Kings Varies
With N and Epsilon
When we plot the weak-node cluster size distribution,
P (Cw), based on maximum likelihood estimates we find
that
P (Cw) ∼ C−ηw eλCw , (S24)
where η = 2.26 ± 0.03 and we find that λ = (0.39 ±
0.01) ×  when N = 105 and 106 (cf. Fig. S15), and η is
measured with  = 3.2 × 10−4. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that, in the duel limit that N → ∞ and
 → 0, the model approaches a self-organized critical
state, where the distribution of Cw,1 becomes a power
law.
The probability for the size of the first weak cluster
that fails, P (Cw,1), is equivalent to picking a node in a
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FIG. S13. (Color online) Scaling of Cw,1 critical values versus
N : Ccrit,DK (magenta circles), Ccrit,1 (blue diamonds), and
Ccrit,2 (red squares). We plot critical values for 3.2× 10−4 ≤
 ≤ 1.0 × 10−1, and fit those values to the model a × Nb,
where b = 0.59± 0.03 for simulations, b = 0.49± 0.01 for the
one-step failure cascade theory, and b = 0.55 ± 0.01 for the
two-step failure cascade theory.
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FIG. S14. (Color online) The probability of DKs as a function
of epsilon. Regardless of N, we find close agreement between
simulations-based probabilities of P (DK) (open symbols) and
theory (Eq. (S30), solid lines), especially for moderate values
of .
cluster of size Cw, leading to
P (Cw,1) =
CwP (Cw)
〈Cw〉 , (S25)
or
P (Cw,1) =
C1−ηw e
λCw
Eη−1(λ)
, (S26)
where
En(z) =
∫ N
1
e−zt
tn
dt. (S27)
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FIG. S15. The exponential cut-off parameter, λ, for the weak-
node cluster distribution, P (Cw), versus  for the CC model
(cf. Fig. S10 for P (Cw)). The best-fit relation between λ and
 is λ = 0.39×  for N = 105 and 106.
Furthermore, we can approximate P (DK|Cw,1) as a
step function,
P (DK|Cw,1) ≈ H(Cw,1 − Ccrit,DK). (S28)
With these assumptions, we can approximate
P (DK|N, ) as
P (DK|N, ) =
∫ N
Ccrit,DK
P (Cw,1)dCw,1. (S29)
If  > 0, then we can further approximate the integral
limit as N →∞. This implies that
P (DK|N, ) =
{
λη−1 Γ(1−η,Ccrit,DKλ)Eη−1(λ)  > 0
Nη(C2−ηcrit,DK−N2−η)
Nη−N2 → 0.
(S30)
We notice two interesting findings. First, we see that
P (DK) varies non-linearly with , meaning a slight in-
crease in repair frequency can dramatically reduce the
number of system-wide failures. Agreement is strongest
when  is moderate, possibly because, when  is too small
for small N , the largest values of Cw are O(N), therefore
the model under-estimates how many DKs are possible.
When  is too large, however, we appear to underestimate
P (DK) again, potentially because the Heaviside approxi-
mation breaks down for small probabilities. We nonethe-
less find good overall agreement with our simulations.
Another interesting implication of our model is that
for → 0 and N →∞,
P (DK|N, 0) ∼ Cη−2crit,DK −O(N2−η). (S31)
Through simulations, we find that Ccrit,DK ∼ N0.59±0.03,
therefore
P (DK|N, 0) ∼ N−β −O(N2−η), (S32)
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FIG. S16. (Color online) Failure size distribution for networks
with different N and different reinforcement probability . (a)
IN model,  = 1.0 × 10−2; (b) IN model,  = 1.0 × 10−3; (c)
CC model,  = 1.0× 10−2; (d) CC model,  = 1.0× 10−3;
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FIG. S17. DK autocorrelation versus lag time. We find that,
regardless of the value of  and regardless of the lag time, the
autocorrelation of DKs over 1.5 × 107 timesteps is very low,
especially as  increases. We do not plot autocorrelations for
 ≥ 1.0× 10−2 because there are few DKs for these values of
 in the time frame studied. The network size is N = 106.
where β = 0.59(2 − η) = 0.15 ± 0.02. In other words,
we find that DKs do not exist in the thermodynamic
limit, but there are unusually large finite size effects. For
example, this scaling implies that P (DK) decreases by
only a factor of 10 when the system increases in size by
ten million. For any real system DKs will exist and an
engineer would be weary to ignore these finite size effects.
IV: Failure Distribution For Finite System Size
Figure 1 in the main text demonstrates that DKs in
the CC model occur for various values of , and our an-
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FIG. S18. (Color online) ROC curves for different N and
different  using two different predictors. The solid lines are
the results predicted by the fraction of weak nodes, and the
open markers represent the results predicted by the size of
the first weak-node cluster.
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FIG. S19. (Color online) The probability the first weak-node
cluster that fails is of size Cw, for N = 10
6 over 15 × N
timesteps and 1 network realization. The vertical lines show
the value of Ccrit,DK.
alytic arguments show DKs occur for all values of  < 1
and N < ∞. We find a superficially similar failure size
distribution, with a bump of size O(N), for the IN model
(see Figs. S16(a) & S16(b)) but only when N and  are
sufficiently small, e.g., N = 104 for  ≤ 10−3. This is
not due to cascading failure, however, because in the
IN model only a single weak-node cluster fails. This
bump exists because there are weak-node clusters that
are O(N), meaning we are in a parameter regime where
there are super-critical percolating clusters.
This contrasts with the CC model, where we see over
99.9% of nodes fail almost independent of the values of 
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FIG. S20. (Color online) The fraction of weak nodes aver-
aged over T timesteps with and without control for N = 106
and 10 network realizations. For the uncontrolled system,
T = 5×N , while for the controlled system T = 10×N .
and N (see Figs. S16(c) & S16(d)). The difference is due
to cascading failures in the CC model, where the moment
a cluster greater than a critical size fails, strong nodes be-
gin to fail, which triggers more weak-node clusters to fail,
etc., until almost all nodes fail (a DK event). Because the
critical weak-node cluster size increases sub-linearly with
N , and because weak-node clusters can be any size less
than N , there is always a chance for weak-node clusters
larger than the critical size to fail, triggering a DK event.
It is an open question in the field of DK theory how
to further classify events such as the bump in the IN
model, which has a heavier-than-power-law probabil-
ity, yet shares the same underlying mechanism as small
events (i.e., the mechanism being the failure of a single
cluster of weak nodes in the IN model.)
V: Receiver operating characteristic curves of all
prediction methods
In the section, Predicting Dragon Kings, in the main
text, we use the area under the receiver operating char-
acteristic curve (AUC) to compare the accuracy of two
predictors: the fraction of weak nodes, p, and the size
of the first weak-node cluster, Cw,1. We briefly mention
that DKs are not highly correlated in time (Fig. S17),
therefore it is non-trivial exercise to find when DKs oc-
cur. Examples of ROC curves are illustrated in Fig. S18.
The ROC curve is created by plotting the true positive
rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) as the
discrimination threshold is varied [29]. Here, the TPR in-
dicates the probability of DKs being correctly predicted.
The FPR is the probability of DKs being wrongly pre-
dicted. We conclude that the second predictor, Cw,1,
is close to being an optimal predictor. Moreover, DKs
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are predicted by Cw,1 with high accuracy, because DKs
are unlikely to occur for Cw,1 < Ccrit,DK, and due to
the power-law distribution of Cw,1 as shown in Fig. S19,
most initial failures lead to small cascades. For example,
when  = 1.0× 10−3, the probability P (Cw,1 < Ccrit,DK)
is 99.986%.
VI: Average fraction of weak nodes with or without
control
In our work, we analyze a control strategy for DKs.
Our objective is to find a strategy that keeps the amount
of weak nodes constant on average compared to the CC
model, but reduces the frequency of DKs. We randomly
pick r weak nodes and consider the size of the weak-node
clusters to which they belong. The largest of these weak-
node clusters is selected and with probability 1 − p(t)
and a random node in that cluster is reinforced. In
Fig. S20, we demonstrate that varying r does not signif-
icantly change the average fraction of weak nodes, even
though it significantly affects the prevalence of DKs, as
shown in the main text.
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